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TORTURE IS NOT PROTECTED SPEECH: FREE SPEECH 
ANALYSIS OF BANS ON GAY CONVERSION THERAPY 
 





Approximately seven hundred thousand Americans have received 
conversion therapy at some point during their lives.1 Such sexual orientation 
change efforts (SOCE) seek to change sexual orientation or gender identity 
from homosexual, bisexual, queer, or transgender to straight and cisgender.2 
Some recipients describe the experience as “torture.”3 In its “talk therapy” 
forms, counselors tell recipients that they are alone, unnatural, and 
“abomination[s]” rejected by God.4 In its “aversion therapy” forms, 
counselors apply ice, heat, and electricity to recipients while showing them 
pictures of gay people holding hands, hugging, and having sex so that they 
 
*  J.D. (2020), Washington University in St. Louis. I want to give a special thanks to Professor 
Gregory P. Magarian for his inestimably valuable advice, encouragement, and critiques in the 
development of this project. I am very grateful. 
1. More than 20,000 LGBT Teens in the U.S. will be Subjected to Conversion Therapy, 
WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCH. L. (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/conversion-therapy-release/ [https://perma.cc/4NNJ-74T6]. 
2.  Id.  
3.  Sam Brinton, I Was Tortured in Gay Conversion Therapy. And It’s Still Legal in 41 States, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/gay-conversion-therapy-
torture.html [https://perma.cc/TW6B-LBNV]. 
For over two years, I sat on a couch and endured emotionally painful 
sessions with a counselor. I was told that my faith community rejected my 
sexuality; that I was the abomination we had heard about in Sunday school; that 
I was the only gay person in the world; that it was inevitable I would get H.I.V. 
and AIDS. 
Id. 
4.  Id. In their job at the Trevor Project, the world’s largest suicide prevention organization for 
LGBTQ youth, Sam Brinton “constantly hear[s] from survivors of conversion therapy who have been 
so hurt that they are contemplating suicide.” Id. “They” and its iterations are common pronouns for 
gender-nonbinary people, recognized by Merriam-Webster dictionary and the American Psychological 
Association in 2019. See Anna North, The Past, Present, and Future of the Singular “They”, VOX (Dec. 
13, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/12/13/21011537/they-merriam-webster-pronouns-nonbinary-
word-year [https://perma.cc/N75N-BXJV]. 












fulwill associate pain with same-sex contact and recoil.5 As attitudes have 
dramatically shifted over the past few decades towards acceptance of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people,6 
conversion therapy has fallen into disrepute both professionally7 and 
publicly.8 In 2018, Hollywood, driven by rising public awareness, released 
two movies about conversion therapy—Boy Erased and The Miseducation 
of Cameron Post.9 The movies themselves will further increase awareness 
of the practice.  
As attitudes have changed, nineteen states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and dozens of municipalities have banned conversion therapy 
 
5.  WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCH. L., supra note 1; JUDITH M. GLASSGOLD ET AL., AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON 
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 22 (2009), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/ resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7Y-MZFP]. 
6.  Sixty-seven percent of Americans support same-sex marriage, up forty points from twenty-
seven percent support in 1996. Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, 
GALLUP (May 23, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/234866/two-three-americans-support-sex-
marriage.aspx?g_source=link_newsv9&g_campaign=item_234848&g_medium=copy 
[https://perma.cc/5J4U-8JG2]. Fifty percent of Americans (rising ten points from just a decade ago) say 
gay and lesbian people are “born that way,” thirty percent attribute sexuality to “upbringing or 
environment,” while ten percent attribute it to both. People who believe gay and lesbian people are “born 
that way” are far more supportive of gay rights than people who do not. Lydia Saad, More Say ‘Nature’ 




7.  Conversion Therapy, AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Policy_Statements/2018/Conversion_Therapy.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/8T4H-BGXH] (“[T]here is evidence that [conversion therapies] are harmful. As a 
result, ‘conversion therapies’ should not be part of any behavioral health treatment of children and 
adolescents.”). Significantly, the American Psychological Association concluded from its systematic 
review of the peer-reviewed journal literature on SOCE “that efforts to change sexual orientation are 
unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of harm, contrary to the claims of SOCE practitioners 
and advocates.” GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 5, at v. 
8.  Eight percent of Americans believe that gay conversion therapy can change a person’s sexual 
orientation from gay to straight. Sixty-three percent of people think conversion therapy cannot change 
someone’s sexuality. Twenty-eight percent are not sure. Peter Moore, Only 8% of Americans Think Gay 
Conversion Therapy Works, YOUGOV (June 12, 2014), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2014/06/12/gay-conversion-therapy 
[https://perma.cc/GEF6-MR6S].  
9.  See Patrick Ryan, What Happens in Gay Conversion Therapy? ‘Cameron Post,’ ‘Boy 
Erased’ Show Scary Reality, USA TODAY (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2018/07/31/gay-conversion-therapy-new-films-show-













as of March 2020.10 Pending federal legislation—the Therapeutic Fraud 
Prevention Act—would outlaw SOCE nationwide.11 The Third and Ninth 
Circuits both have upheld states’ bans on conversion therapy for minors by 
licensed professionals but relied on very different reasoning.12 The Third 
Circuit in King v. Governor of New Jersey upheld New Jersey’s ban on 
conversion therapy as a permissible regulation of speech, reasoning that 
because conversion therapy constitutes “professional speech,” it receives 
lesser value protection than other types of speech.13 The Ninth Circuit in 
Pickup v. Brown upheld California’s ban on conversion therapy as a 
permissible regulation of conduct.14 The Ninth Circuit found that 
conversion therapy was conduct because it only banned the performance of 
the therapy; it left open the ability for people to advocate and debate 
conversion therapy and allowed practitioners to discuss it with their patients 
as long as they did not practice it.15 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
both cases.16  
In 2018, however, the Supreme Court greatly unsettled the law on free 
speech challenges to bans on conversion therapy. Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to invalidate a ban on conversion therapy or take up a case 
 
10.  Michael Gold, New York Passes Ban on ‘Conversion Therapy’ After Years-Long Efforts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/nyregion/conversion-therapy-
ban.html [https://perma.cc/5FGD-7MYE]. The following states have banned conversion therapy: 
Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, Illinois, New York, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
and Hawaii. See Conversion Therapy Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy [https://perma.cc/X9N9-WBUV]. 
Additionally, North Carolina’s governor partially banned conversation therapy when he banned the use 
of taxpayer dollars for conversion therapy practices. Id. Some counties and municipalities have also 
taken the lead. For example, on December 23, 2019, St. Louis banned conversion therapy on minors by 
licensed professionals. Dori Olmos, Conversion Therapy on Minors Now Banned in St. Louis, KSDK-
TV (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/local/conversion-therapy-st-louis-ban-
minors/63-e5bc9149-c253-4bbc-b08a-783f8e8c7869 [https://perma.cc/98EP-9JCA].  
11.  Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 3570, 116th Cong. (2019) (banning as a 
fraudulent trade practice accepting payment for practicing SOCE on both adults and minors).  
12.  See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 
(2015), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1567 (2019) (petitioners had asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the 
petition in light of NIFLA); Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014). 
13.  King, 767 F.3d at 312–20.  
14.  Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1223.  
15.  Id. The words “practitioner” and “patient” are both distant and clinical descriptors which 
unfortunately legitimize SOCE through implicit comparison to proper medical practices.   
16.  See supra note 12.  












squarely on conversion therapy, the Court did abrogate what it characterized 
as the reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits, severely undercutting the 
current legal justifications for upholding bans on SOCE.17 The Court in 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 
expressly rejected efforts by lower courts to create a new category of 
speech—“professional speech”—entitled to lower value protection than 
other speech.18 
The ruling in NIFLA prompted several legal challenges to SOCE bans 
around the country.19 In January 2019, a federal judge granted a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting Tampa, Florida, from enforcing its ban on SOCE, 
citing the ruling in NIFLA as support.20 The legal validity of bans on SOCE 
against free speech challenges remains uncertain.21  
Free speech challenges rise and fall on the standard of review. 
Viewpoint-based and content-based regulations of speech receive strict 
 
17.  Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) 
(holding unconstitutional compelled notices at clinics providing pregnancy-related services that stated 
the clinics were unlicensed and gave directions to places where people could receive publicly funded 
contraceptive and abortion services). At least one federal court has acknowledged this possible 
abrogation, stating, “These two cases, from the U.S. Ninth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals, were 
criticized by name and possibly abrogated on First Amendment grounds.” Vazzo v. City of Tampa, No. 
8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, 2019 WL 4919302, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2019). 
18.  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. The so-called “professional speech” category would have 
provided lower value protection and applied intermediate scrutiny, analogous to the “commercial 
speech” category. Id. 
19.  Zack Ford, Orthodox Jewish Therapist Claims NYC’s Conversion Therapy Ban Violates His 
Rights, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://thinkprogress.org/conversion-therapy-lawsuits-
4fa36d5cb4de/ [https://perma.cc/S63W-2BZ3]. Lawsuits that challenge New York City’s and 
Maryland’s bans on SOCE are pending. Id. 
20.  Vazzo, No. 8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, slip op. at 2, 26 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Tampa-conversion-therapy-opinion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4BL-VE8M] (ruling that communication during SOCE talk therapy is speech, not 
conduct, subject to strict scrutiny as content-based regulation of speech); Zack Ford, Federal Judge Says 
Harmful Conversion Therapy is Just “Speech” and Shouldn’t be Restricted, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 31, 
2019), https://thinkprogress.org/federal-judge-florida-halt-ban-conversion-therapy-free-speech-
6e98a2d3a2ea/ [https://perma.cc/H8KU-4VQD].  
21.  Warren G. Tucker, Note, It’s Not Called Conduct Therapy; Talk Therapy as a Protected 
Form of Speech Under the First Amendment, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 885, 886 (2015) (arguing 
that “the Supreme Court may grant certiorari if this issue appears before it again, especially if one of the 













scrutiny,22 and courts almost always invalidate them.23 Content-neutral 
regulations with incidental effects on speech receive a form of intermediate 
scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien.24 Truly viewpoint-neutral and 
content-neutral regulations of speech receive rational basis scrutiny.25 
Conduct-based regulations receive rational basis scrutiny and “bear[] a 
strong presumption of validity.”26 There are, of course, a coterie of kinds of 
communications which are entirely outside the scope of the First 
Amendment’s coverage—including antitrust law, securities regulation, and 
criminal solicitation—and that have traditionally received no protection at 
all.27 The Third Circuit found New Jersey’s ban a speech regulation while 
the Ninth Circuit found California’s ban a conduct regulation.28 However, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA generated a lot of uncertainty and 
muddied the water about whether bans on SOCE regulate speech, conduct, 
a mixture, or whether a First Amendment free speech analysis even applies 
to SOCE.  
There is a diverse range of scholarly interpretations on how to 
conceptualize SOCE and the constitutionality of such bans. Eugene Volokh 
argues that SOCE needs to be analyzed as “speech” and rejects the 
 
22.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2226 (2015) (explaining that content-based regulations “target speech based on its communicative 
content”).  
23.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (stating that strict 
scrutiny is a “demanding standard” and “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible”).  
24.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The four-part O’Brien test says that 
the government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is “within the constitutional power of the 
government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest, if the government interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of speech, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id. 
25.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).  
26.  See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (“On rational basis review, 
a classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking 
the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support it.’”(citations omitted)). Additionally, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is 
incorporated against the states. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (dicta). 
27.  See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2003). 
28.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 












application of O’Brien intermediate scrutiny.29 Using Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project,30 he argues that just as the Court held that 
offering advice to terrorist groups counted as speech, so too must the words 
exchanged in conversion therapy count as speech subject to strict scrutiny 
for the First Amendment.31 Others argue that courts should subject the bans 
(and other regulations of psychotherapy) to intermediate scrutiny analogous 
to O’Brien and uphold them as long as long as there is a significant 
government interest with means which avoid restricting substantially more 
speech than necessary.32 Still others argue that SOCE is “professional 
speech,” which as a category should have lower value protection.33 Another 
author, Professor Calvert, rejects the traditional levels of scrutiny entirely, 
arguing that Justice Breyer’s “proportionality approach” is the best 
methodology to handle speech cases of this kind; Calvert argues that 
Breyer’s approach is consequentialist, weighing the negative effects on free 
expression against the societal benefits.34 
Conversely, it is argued that bans on conversion therapy fail to 
distinguish between different kinds of conversion therapy—i.e., between 
aversion therapy and talk therapy—and that these prohibitions interfere with 
 
29.  Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981, 1046 (2016) (arguing that the speech-and-action distinction is “unprincipled and subject to 
manipulation”); see also Tucker, supra note 21, at 886 (arguing that SOCE, particularly talk therapy, 
must be analyzed as speech for First Amendment purposes, fearful of the chilling effect on therapist-
client communication and government overreach).  
30.  561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
31.  Volokh, supra note 29, at 1046. Even so, Volokh concedes that “[s]ome restrictions on 
professional-client speech may well be constitutional,” reasoning the government asserts a valid interest 
“because clients are particularly likely to put their physical, psychological, or financial well-being at 
risk when relying on the expertise of professionals.” Id. at 1048.  
32.  Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 681, 708-09; 749-52 (2016). 
33.  Id. at 689–90; Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671 (2017) 
(arguing that SOCE would not be entitled to “professional speech” protection because its practitioners 
are “external outliers” to what the expert community recognizes as proper medical treatment).  
34.  Clay Calvert, Testing the First Amendment Validity of Laws Banning Sexual Orientation 
Change Efforts on Minors: What Level of Scrutiny Applies After Becerra and Does a Proportionality 
Approach Provide a Solution?,  47 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 30-42 (2019). 
Is the injury done by a statute to a constitutional right such as freedom of 
expression—more specifically, the negative consequences to the purposes and 
core values served by protecting speech under the First Amendment—
disproportionate to the beneficial outcomes brought by the statute in serving the 
government’s purported regulatory interest?  













the autonomy and self-determination of LGBTQ individuals who want to 
live in accordance with their religious beliefs.35 Much of the legal 
scholarship improperly ignores the important distinction between aversion 
therapy and talk therapy.36 It is a huge conceptual and empirical mistake to 
fail to distinguish between aversion therapy and talk therapy, as this 
distinction is critical for analyzing the free speech claims.37  
Other authors consider statutory bans on SOCE “particularly amenable 
to First Amendment challenges” and instead advocate applying already 
existing laws, which prevent licensed professionals from engaging in 
deceptive or misleading practices, to stop SOCE.38 Indeed, one author wrote 
that consumer fraud “litigation continues to be the best route towards 
national cessation of conversion therapy.”39 Others remain skeptical of the 
consumer fraud approach, arguing that “major weaknesses exist within state 
consumer protection laws that frustrate the ability to ensure that SOCE 
practitioners are liable for deceptive trade practices.”40 
The fundamental failure of current scholarship on the topic and the 
approach taken by the Third Circuit in King and the Ninth Circuit in Pickup 
II is that they fall into the trap of the speech-and-action distinction. This 
kind of analysis focuses heavily on distinguishing between kinds of 
activities to determine where they fall on the scale between 
noncommunicative conduct and communicative expression. This can be 
characterized as “unprincipled and subject to manipulation.”41 Opponents 
of SOCE conceptualize it as conduct or invent the “professional speech” 
category while those opposed to the bans call SOCE’s “talk therapy” a form 
 
35.  Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. 
L. REV. 793 (2017). 
36.  For a rare exception, see Tucker, supra note 21, at 909–10, acknowledging in a short 
comment that several kinds of conversion therapy “do not have a speech element, such as aversion 
therapy and conditioning” and admitting that “[w]ith these therapies, along with those where speech is 
not as deeply imbedded as it is in talk therapy, a state has a lot more leeway for prohibitions.”  
37.  See infra Section I.A. 
38.  Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California 
Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 132 YALE L.J. 1532, 1536 (2014).  
39.  Peter R. Dubrowski, The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict and a Path Towards National 
Cessation of Gay-To-Straight “Conversion Therapy,” 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77, 98 (2015).  
40.  John M. Satira, Note, Determining the Deception of Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 641, 644–45 (2016) (examining Ferguson v. JONAH, a New Jersey state-level 
case, where the plaintiffs won their consumer fraud claim against their former SOCE therapists).  
41.  Volokh, supra note 29, at 1046.  












of speech which requires strict scrutiny. It is necessary to shift the frame of 
focus entirely.  
The paradigm shift should be this: conversion therapy is not covered by 
the First Amendment. The distinction between First Amendment 
“coverage” and “protection” is admirably laid out by Frederick Schauer.42 
In many cases, there is an undiscussed threshold question: does the First 
Amendment cover this kind of speech?43 There are many kinds of 
communications which are outside free speech coverage: securities 
regulations, antitrust law, the National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the law of contracts, fraud, conspiracy law, and the 
law of evidence, to name a few.44 All of these laws, if they were treated as 
within First Amendment coverage, would constitute content-based 
regulations of speech and fail strict scrutiny.45 Once a kind of 
communication is considered to rest within First Amendment coverage, then 
it is necessary to determine what kind of protection it receives.46 These are 
the myriad legal rules for incitement,47 libel,48 or nonmisleading commercial 
advertising.49 The courts in Pickup II and King made a fatal error when they 
jumped the gun by failing to consider the threshold question: Is this speech 
within the coverage of the First Amendment? 
This note argues that conversion therapy is not covered by First 
Amendment. First, aversion therapy is conduct and survives rational basis 
review, as the ban rationally serves the legitimate purpose of protecting 
minors from incredibly harmful therapy.50 Second, talk therapy forms of 
SOCE, while they are communications, are outside the coverage of the First 
Amendment. SOCE is analogous to fraud, as it is a demonstrably harmful 
 
42.  Schauer, supra note 27, at 1765 (arguing that legal doctrine and free speech theory usually 
explain what is protected within First Amendment boundaries but that the boundaries of coverage the 
First Amendment provides are dictated more by an “often serendipitous array of political, cultural, and 
economic factors”). 
43.  See id. at 1766.  
44.  Id. at 1768.  
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 1769.  
47.  See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
48.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
49.  See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
50.  “In the past, aversive treatments included inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing 
electric shocks; or having an individual snap an elastic band around the wrist when aroused by same-
sex erotic images or thoughts. Even more drastic methods, such as castration, have been used.” Pickup 













and failed practice.51 It is like medical and professional malpractice, which 
are well within the power of governments to regulate.52 Further, under their 
police powers, states possess extensive powers to regulate medical 
professionals to protect the health, safety, and well-being of their citizens.53 
In the context of statutory construction, the Court has held that in “general 
usage and modern understanding. . . health . . . includes psychological as 
well as physical well-being.”54 Bans on SOCE by licensed medical 
professionals are consistent with the underlying philosophical and social 
justifications for First Amendment protection.55  
Part I—History—lays out the relevant background. Section I.A surveys 
the history of SOCE and the rise of laws prohibiting the practices. Section 
I.B examines the free speech challenges to bans on SOCE. This examination 
also illuminates the futility of the speech-and-action distinction and why 
these approaches fail to provide a satisfactory answer. Section I.C discusses 
the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, focusing solely on its 
implications for the speech of professionals and bans on SOCE.56 This 
section examines the failure of the so-called “professional speech” category 
to take hold as a category of speech with lower value protection analogous 
to “commercial speech.” Section I.D covers the law regarding free speech 
challenges by professionals like doctors and lawyers to licensing schemes 
and professional regulations. This reveals how the Court considers novel 
arguments of free speech coverage and the propriety of government 
regulation for the public’s health and safety.  
 
51.  See Victor, supra note 38; Satira, supra note 40; Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-
12, 2015 WL 609436 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
52.  See Haupt, supra note 33, at 679–82. 
53.  See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (“According to settled principles, 
the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established 
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”). 
54.  United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971). 
55.  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5 (Foundation Press, 
6th ed. 2016). There are three principal reasons to protect freedom of speech: advancing truth in the 
marketplace of ideas, facilitating representative democracy and self-government, and promoting 
individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment. Id. at 5–10. See infra notes 214-23.  
56.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (abrogating King 
v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014)); Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore-
King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2013). All three of these cases, in the Court’s view, 
improperly accorded speech lower value protection because it was “professional speech,” a categorical 
approach unrecognized in First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2371–72. 












In Part II—Analysis & Proposal—it is argued that SOCE must be 
conceptually divided between aversion therapy and talk therapy. Aversion 
therapy is conduct, surviving rational basis review. It is further necessary to 
shift the paradigm away from the speech-and-action distinction to determine 
the protection talk therapy receives and explain why SOCE should not be 
covered by the First Amendment. To protect the health and safety of their 
citizens, states have extensive police powers to regulate medical 
professionals.57 Part II concludes that courts and First Amendment scholars 
must take more seriously the threshold question of whether a kind of 
communication belongs within the coverage of the First Amendment. It also 
advocates the passage of the pending federal legislation that would ban 




A. The Gruesome History of Conversion Therapy and State Prohibitions 
 
SOCE developed from the science of sexuality beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century when homosexuality was viewed as a criminal and 
medical problem.59 There are many kinds of SOCE. The earliest were based 
on psychoanalytic theory, influenced by Sigmund Freud, which viewed 
homosexuality as a “developmental arrest” on the path to the adult norm of 
heterosexuality.60 Other approaches more loosely based on psychoanalytic 
ideas “advocated altering gender-role behaviors to increase conformity with 
traditional gender roles.”61 Behavior therapy emerged in the 1960s, 
consisting of both aversive and nonaversive treatments.62 
Behavior therapists tried a variety of aversion treatments, 
such as inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing 
electric shocks; or having the individual snap an elastic 
band around the wrist when the individual became aroused 
to same-sex erotic images or thoughts. Other examples of 
 
57.  See Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72. 
58.  Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 3570, 116th Cong. (2019). 
59.  GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 5, at 21. 
60.  Id.  
61.  Id. at 22.  













aversive behavioral treatments included covert 
sensitization, shame aversion, systematic desensitization, 
orgasmic reconditioning, and satiation therapy. Some 
nonaversive treatments used an educational process of 
dating skills, assertiveness, and affection training with 
physical and social reinforcement to increase other-sex 
sexual behaviors.63 
Aversion therapy is very invasive, as “[e]ven more drastic methods, such 
as castration, have been used.”64 
Cognitive therapists also practiced SOCE; they sought “to change gay 
men’s and lesbians’ thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting 
thoughts, or using hypnosis, with the goal of changing sexual arousal, 
behavior, and orientation.”65 Participation in SOCE is often involuntary.66 
Many participants in the early studies on SOCE “were court-mandated to 
receive treatment.”67 American eugenicists in the late nineteenth through the 
late twentieth century were deeply anxious about queer sexuality and 
ostracized menaces to their heteronormative mold.68 Psychiatrists, allies of 
the eugenics movement, advocated sterilization and vasectomies to convert 
people from gay to straight.69 A similar procedure for women, severing the 
oviduct, would cure them of any same-sex attraction.70 Dozens of states 
adopted eugenic sterilization laws. Over sixty thousand people were 
sterilized in the name of eugenics in the United States.71 It is difficult to 
know how many of these people were queer, but Peter Boag documented 
how in Washington and Oregon men caught in homosexual acts were 
 
63.  Id. (citations omitted).  
64.  Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014). 
65.  GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 5, at 22 (citations omitted). 
66.  Id. at 3. 
67.  Id.   
68.  Mason D. Bracken, Queers, Quacks, and the Quest for the Perfect Family: Eugenicists’ 
Attitudes Towards Members of the LGBTQ Community, 23 APPRENTICE HISTORIAN 17, 17, 22 (2017); 
see, e.g., NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE SCIENCE OF 
NATIONALISM (2003) xiii-xv; ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS 
OF BETTER BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA (2005) 18-23, 184-85, 196-97.   
69.  Bracken, supra note 68, at 22, 26-34. 
70.  Id. at 30.  
71.  Id. at 33.  












labelled sexual deviants and forcibly sterilized as a method of sexual 
regulation.72 
Practitioners of SOCE include licensed and unlicensed mental health 
professionals as well as religious counselors.73 Since the American 
Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the listing of 
psychiatric disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) in 1973,74 an increased number of religious organizations 
offered SOCE.75 Wyatt-Nichol argued that this “represents a shift back from 
the medical model to religious organizations” providing “an institutional 
control of homosexuality in society.”76 Moreover, many psychiatrists 
dissented from these changes, and in 1992, mental health professionals who 
continued to view homosexuality as a mental disorder founded the National 
Association for the Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), an 
organization that believes in the efficacy of conversion therapy and is 
aligned with numerous right-wing Christian groups with an anti-LGBTQ 
agenda.77  
Since removing homosexuality from the DSM, the American 
Psychiatric Association has taken various incremental steps towards 
destigmatization of gay and lesbian people.78 In total, these steps constitute 
a radical change in the profession which today rejects SOCE as 
scientifically unsound and potentially harmful.79 In 1998, the American 
Psychiatric Association issued a position statement which that said 
reparative and conversion therapies “[were] at odds with [their] scientific 
position.”80 Seeking a comprehensive answer, the American Psychological 
Association conducted a systematic review of the peer-reviewed journal 
 
72.  PETER BOAG, SAME-SEX AFFAIRS: CONSTRUCTING AND CONTROLLING HOMOSEXUALITY 
IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (2003). 
73.  Heather Wyatt-Nichol, Sexual Orientation and Mental Health: Incremental Progression or 
Radical Change?, 37 J. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. 225, 233 (2014). 
74.  GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 5, at 11. In December 1974, the American Psychological 
Association passed a resolution which affirmed the American Psychiatric Association’s decision and 
urged all mental health professionals to work to remove the stigma against homosexuality. Id. at 23–24. 
75.  Wyatt-Nichol, supra note 73, at 233.  
76.  Id.  
77.  Id. (these include the Traditional Values Coalition, Concerned Women for America, Focus 
on the Family, the Family Research Council, and the 700 Club). 
78.  Id. at 230, 234. 
79.  Id. at 234. 













literature on SOCE and concluded “that efforts to change sexual orientation 
are unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of harm, contrary to the 
claims of SOCE practitioners and advocates.”81 In a separate survey, the 
vast majority of about four hundred people who experienced SOCE said it 
caused them shame, emotional harm, and depression.82 Some developed 
drug or alcohol abuse, 158 felt suicidal, and seventy-two attempted 
suicide.83 Seven hundred thousand Americans have received SOCE.84 An 
estimated twenty thousand LGBTQ youth will undergo conversion therapy 
from a licensed health care professional before the age of eighteen.85 
Approximately fifty-seven thousand minors will receive treatment from a 
religious or spiritual advisor.86  
The first two states to ban conversion therapy for minors by licensed 
medical professionals were California and New Jersey.87 On September 29, 
2012, California’s governor signed a bill which banned mental health 
providers from practicing SOCE on minors. The law defines SOCE as “any 
practices by mental health providers that seek to change an individual’s 
sexual orientation. This includes efforts to change behaviors of gender 
expressions, or to eliminate or reduce romantic attractions or feelings 
toward individuals of the same sex.”88 New Jersey banned licensed medical 






81.  GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 5, at v.  
82.  Jallen Rix, The Ex-Gay Survivor’s Survey Results, BEYOND EXGAY (2013), 
https://beyondexgay.com/survey/results/q10.html [https://perma.cc/XA7Q-2D52]. 
83.  Id. Question 10 asked, “If you feel that you were harmed, please check the below boxes that 
describe the kinds of harm you experienced: (check as many as applicable).” Id.  
84.  WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCH. L., supra note 1.  
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Gov. Jerry Brown bans gay-to-straight therapy for minors, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012), 
https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/09/governor-jerry-brown-gay-therapy-
minors.html [https://perma.cc/9ABL-FZDC] (“These practices have no basis in science or medicine and 
they will now be relegated to the dustbin of quackery.”); Christie Signs Ban on Gay Conversion Therapy, 
N.J. MONTHLY (Aug. 19, 2013), https://njmonthly.com/articles/from-the-editors/christie-signs-ban-on-
gay-conversion-therapy/ [https://perma.cc/X8Y6-FQWP]. 
88.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (West 2013).  
89.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2018). 












B. Free Speech Challenges to Bans on SOCE 
 
Courts inconsistently apply the speech-and-action distinction to SOCE. 
In California, two district courts split on the issue of whether to strike down 
the state’s ban on SOCE. In Welch v. Brown, SOCE practitioners sought a 
declaratory judgment to find the law unconstitutional and a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement.90 The court only ruled on their free speech 
challenge, avoiding the arguments that the law violated the right to privacy 
as well as the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and that it was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.91 The court ruled that because the 
law regulated talk therapy based on the message conveyed, the law 
regulated speech based on its content.92 The legislature engaged in content-
based and viewpoint-based discrimination by limiting the subject matter in 
talk therapy under discussion and only regulating the viewpoint that 
homosexuality can and should be changed.93 The state failed strict scrutiny 
review because it failed to assert a compelling interest, and the law was 
underinclusive because it only applied to mental health providers.94 
Therefore, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the law’s 
enforcement.95  
Separately, in Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I), the plaintiffs argued the law 
violated their First Amendment rights.96 This court, however, found that the 
law regulated conduct, not speech. The law prevented mental health 
professionals from engaging in the therapy itself but still allowed them to 
publicly discuss SOCE and recommend it to their patients.97 The court 
considered it immaterial that some of the therapy was conducted via speech, 
relying on National Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. 
California Board of Psychology (NAAP).98 In NAAP, the plaintiffs 
 
90.  907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
91.  Id. at 1105 n.1.  
92.  Id. at 1117.  
93.  Id.  
94.  Id. at 1121.  
95.  Id. at 1122.  
96.  42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1350 (E.D. Cal. 2012).  
97.  Id. at 1358–62.  
98.  228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000). In NAAP, the plaintiffs challenged California’s licensing 
scheme for psychoanalysts under the First Amendment. The court noted that a course of conduct may 
be regulated even if it is “in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out through means of language, either 













challenged California’s licensing scheme for psychoanalysts under the First 
Amendment. The court noted that a course of conduct may be regulated 
even if it is “in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out through means of 
language, either spoken, or written, or printed.”99 The NAAP court rejected 
the claim that psychoanalysis is “pure speech” because “the key component 
of psychoanalysis is the treatment of emotional suffering and depression, 
not speech. . . . That psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their clients does 
not entitle them, or their profession, to special First Amendment 
protection.”100 Using this precedent, the court in Pickup I found that 
California’s SOCE law regulated conduct; therefore, rational basis review 
applied.101 The court found that California had a legitimate, rational reason 
for prohibiting this practice and it chose appropriate means.102 Therefore, 
the law survived a free speech challenge.103  
The Ninth Circuit consolidated the two appeals in Pickup II, affirming 
Pickup I and overruling Welch.104 The court followed Pickup I’s reasoning 
that the law regulated conduct, not speech, and thus was subject to rational-
basis review.105 The court emphasized the narrowness of the law which only 
prohibited therapists from conducting the therapy while still allowing them 
to publicly advocate for SOCE, inform their patients of SOCE, recommend 
SOCE, administer SOCE to any consenting person eighteen years of age or 
older, refer minors to unlicensed counselors, allow religious leaders to 
administer SOCE to minors and adults, and encourage minors to seek SOCE 
in other states.106 The court reasoned that this approach is necessary 
because, otherwise, “any prohibition of a particular medical treatment 
would raise First Amendment concerns because of its incidental effect on 
 
502 (1949)). The court rejected the claim that psychoanalysis is “pure speech,” quoting the district 
court’s determination that “the key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of emotional suffering 
and depression, not speech. . . . That psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their clients does not entitle 
them, or their profession, to special First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1054.  
99.  Id. at 1053 (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502). 
100.  Id. at 1054. 
101.  Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1362, 1376.  
102.  Id.  
103.  Id. at 1376–77.  
104.  Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).  
105.  Id. at 1229 (concluding that the law banning SOCE “is the regulation of professional 
conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on 
speech”). 
106.  Id. at 1223. 












speech.”107 Such an application of the First Amendment would unduly 
restrict the states’ power to regulate licensed professions and would be 
inconsistent with the principle that “it has never been deemed an 
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct 
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”108  
The court found support for the legislature’s stated purpose of 
preventing harm to minors, noting that “[t]he legislature relied on the well-
documented, prevailing opinion of the medical and psychological 
community” that SOCE is ineffective and harmful, such as reports from 
many professional mental health organizations including the American 
Psychological Association and American Psychiatric Association.109 The 
court found that the government asserted a valid interest and the means 
chosen to do so were related to the government’s purpose, so the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the free speech challenge.110 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.111  
The Third Circuit also upheld New Jersey’s ban on SOCE but for 
different reasons than the Ninth Circuit. The district court in King v. 
Christie, considering the free speech challenge, ruled that the law regulated 
conduct, not speech, relying heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Pickup II.112 New Jersey’s ban was substantially similar to California’s 
because it only prevented licensed practitioners from engaging in the 
therapy itself on minors, but it did not prevent them from publicly or 
privately opining on SOCE, discussing it as an option with their clients, or 
referring people to unlicensed counselors, such as religious leaders.113 
 
107.  Id. at 1229 (citing Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that while the 
government cannot prohibit a doctor from recommending or discussing medical marijuana with patients 
because of the Free Speech Clause, the government may ban the prescription of marijuana without 
violating doctors’ speech rights because the words spoken or written for a prescription are incidental to 
the conduct of authorizing a prescription)). 
108.  Id. at 1229 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).  
109.  The others were “the American School Counselor Association, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers, the 
American Counseling Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Academy 
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the Pan American Health Organization.” Id. at 1223–24.  
110.  Id. at 1232.  
111.  Pickup v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014). 
112.  King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 303 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub. nom. King v. Governor 
of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 













Further, the district court reasoned that the words spoken during therapy 
were merely the “tool” employed by therapists to administer treatment. The 
district court stated that 
the line of demarcation between conduct and speech is 
whether the counselor is attempting to communicate 
information or a particular viewpoint to the client or 
whether the counselor is attempting to apply methods, 
practices, and procedures to bring about a change in the 
client—the former is speech and the latter is conduct.114  
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that, because they 
exclusively practiced SOCE through talking, the law had incidental effects 
on speech which would have triggered intermediate scrutiny under the 
O’Brien test, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to “show that their conduct is 
inherently expressive.”115 To show that they were engaged in “inherently 
expressive conduct,” the plaintiffs needed to but failed to show “that talk 
therapy (1) is intended to be communicative, and (2) would be understood 
as such by their clients.”116 The court found that “SOCE counseling is not 
like other forms of conduct traditionally found to be ‘inherently expressive,’ 
such as the burning of a draft card in O’Brien or the burning of a flag in 
Texas v. Johnson.”117 The court was concerned that if it found that the 
counseling was expressive conduct, then many laws regulating 
professionals (like doctors and therapists) would face heightened scrutiny 
and thus likely be invalidated.118 As a regulation of conduct, the law needed 
only to survive rational basis review, and the state asserted a valid interest 
in protecting minors from demonstrably harmful conduct.119 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the free 
speech challenge, but unlike the district court and the Ninth Circuit, found 
that the law regulated speech, not conduct: “speech is speech, and it must 
be analyzed as such for purposes of the First Amendment.”120 Rejecting the 
argument of the district court that the spoken words became conduct 
 
114.  Id. at 319.  
115.  Id. at 321.  
116.  Id. at 322.  
117.  Id. at 323.  
118.  Id. at 319.  
119.  Id. at 325.  
120.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 
(2015). 












because they were merely the “tool” by which the therapy happened, the 
court said, “the argument that verbal communications become ‘conduct’ 
when they are used to deliver professional services was rejected by 
Humanitarian Law Project. Further, the enterprise of labelling certain 
verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and others ‘conduct’ is 
unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”121 The Third Circuit 
elaborated that in Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court addressed 
a federal statute prohibiting the provision of “material support” to 
designated terrorist organizations.122 The plaintiffs argued that the statute 
violated their free speech rights by preventing them from providing legal 
training and advice on conflict resolution.123 The government argued this 
was conduct because the statute was targeted at conduct—providing aid to 
terrorist organizations. The Court held that the law inescapably regulated 
speech because the plaintiffs were “communicating a message” and that did 
not change “based on the nature or function” the speech served.124  
Even so, although the Third Circuit held that the law regulated speech, 
the court reasoned that only intermediate scrutiny applied because the law 
regulated “professional speech.”125 The court argued, “The authority of the 
States to regulate the practice of certain professions is deeply rooted in our 
nation’s jurisprudence.”126 The court tracked what it identified as the 
historical development of the professional speech doctrine.127 The court 
held that  
a professional’s speech warrants lesser protection only 
when it is used to provide personalized services to a client 
based on the professional’s expert knowledge and 
judgment. By contrast, when a professional is speaking to 
the public at large or offering her personal opinion to a 
 
121.  Id. at 228 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that the 
“material support statute” was a content-based regulation of speech, but nevertheless upholding the law 
under application of strict scrutiny)).  
122.  Id. at 225.  
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 237.  
126.  Id. at 229.  













client, her speech remains entitled to the full scope of 
protection afforded by the First Amendment.128 
The court held that SOCE counseling is professional speech because by 
speaking, SOCE practitioners provide specialized services to clients.129 
Drawing on the commercial speech doctrine, the court held that 
intermediate scrutiny applied: “professional speech receives diminished 
protection, and, accordingly, [ ] prohibitions of professional speech are 
constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s interest in protecting 
its citizens from harmful or ineffective professional practices and are no 
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”130 The Third Circuit 
held the law survived intermediate scrutiny because of the state’s strong 
interest in protecting minors from practices demonstrated by psychologists 
and psychiatrists to be harmful,131 and the state’s means directly advanced 
the asserted interest without being overly restrictive.132 It is significant that 
the only two federal appeals court cases directly on point rejected free 
speech challenges to bans on licensed medical professionals practicing 
SOCE on minors.  
 
C. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra 
 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of 
SOCE prohibitions. However, in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Court abrogated the 
Third and Ninth Circuit’s reasonings which upheld the laws against free 
speech challenges.133  
The Supreme Court invalidated a California law requiring licensed 
crisis pregnancy centers—nearly all run by religious organizations—to 
display a notice about the availability of state-funded contraceptive and 
abortion services.134 The law also required unlicensed facilities providing 
 
128.  Id. at 232 (citations omitted).  
129.  Id. at 233.  
130.  Id.  
131.  Id. at 237.  
132.  Id. at 240. 
133.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (abrogating King 
v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore-King 
v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a law regulating fortune tellers as valid 
regulation of “professional speech”)).  
134.  Id. The statute required this notice at licensed, covered facilities: “California has public 
programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services 












pregnancy-related services to display a notice that they were unlicensed by 
the state.135 The Ninth Circuit upheld the licensed notice as valid regulations 
of speech under the “lower level of scrutiny” it applied to “professional 
speech” and upheld the unlicensed notice as valid under any level of 
scrutiny.136 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court divided 5-4,137 held that 
the licensed notice was a “content-based regulation of speech” because the 
compelled notices “alte[r] the content of [their] speech” in that they require 
pro-life organizations to provide women with information about how to get 
abortions, antithetical to their stated mission.138 The Court expressly 
rejected the “professional speech” category as a kind of speech entitled to 
lower-value protection.139  Justice Thomas added, “This Court has ‘been 
reluctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished constitutional 
protection.’”140 In so holding, the Court expressly abrogated the reasoning 
in King v. Governor of New Jersey of the Third Circuit and Pickup II of the 
Ninth Circuit.141 These cases, in the Court’s view, improperly “except[ed] 
professional speech from the rule that content-based regulations of speech 
are subject to strict scrutiny.”142 The Court never said that conversion 
 
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. 
To determine whether you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the telephone 
number].” Id. at 2369 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 123472(a)(1)).  
135.  Id. at 2369–70. The statute required this notice at unlicensed, covered facilities: “This 
facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical 
provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.” Id. at 2370 (citing CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 123472(b)(1)). 
136.  Id. at 2370 (citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 
2016)).  
137.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kennedy were in the 
majority. Justice Kennedy filed a concurrence, and Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor. 
138.  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
795 (1988)).  
139.  Id. at 2371–72. “[T]his Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category 
of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’” Id. Justice Thomas 
added, “This Court’s precedents do not recognize such a tradition for a category called ‘professional 
speech.’” Id. at 2372. 
140.  Id. at 2372 (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.727, 804 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)); see, 
e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (refusing to make violent video games 
unprotected category of speech); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (refusing to make 
depictions of animal cruelty unprotected category of speech). 
141.  Id. at 2371–72. The Court also abrogated Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 
(9th Cir. 2013).  













therapy is speech that it is covered by the First Amendment, or what level 
of protection applies to conversion therapy, nor did it invalidate state laws 
banning conversion therapy.143 Even so, taking a scythe to the root of the 
reasoning upholding these bans greatly unsettles the law on SOCE.144 
 
 
D. First Amendment Challenges by Professionals to  
Licensing Schemes and Professional Conduct 
 
Courts are often faced with cases presenting at least incidental free 
speech interests or situations of novel First Amendment application. An 
analysis of a couple cases reveals the flexible approach taken in these 
contexts. In NAAP,145 the Ninth Circuit upheld against a free speech 
challenge California’s requirements that psychologists receive a license to 
practice. An organization of psychoanalysts alleged that California’s mental 
health licensing laws abridged their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process and equal protection rights and their First Amendment rights of 
speech and association.146 The court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment 
claim because they concluded the licensing scheme did not implicate a 
fundamental right and “there is no fundamental right to choose a mental 
health professional with specific training.”147 Addressing the free speech 
claim, the court explained that merely because psychoanalysis is speech, it 
does not constitute “pure speech” entitled to the highest protection. The 
court stated that “the key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of 
emotional suffering and depression, not speech. . . . That psychoanalysts 
employ speech to treat their clients does not entitle them, or their profession, 
to special First Amendment protection.”148 The court noted that the Supreme 
Court has ruled that “an attorney’s in-person solicitation of clients is 
‘entitled to some constitutional protection,’ but ‘is subject to regulation in 
 
143.  Id. at 2371–72.  
144.  See generally Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 
186 (2018).  
145.  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 
(9th Cir. 2000).  
146.  Id. at 1049. 
147.  Id. at 1049–50.  
148.  Id. at 1054.  












furtherance of important state interests.’”149 Then, the court cited 
“‘numerous’ examples of communications ‘that are regulated without 
offending the First Amendment,’” such as “the exchange of securities 
information, corporate proxy statements, exchange of price and production 
information among competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for the 
labor activities of employees.”150 The court added that “[i]t is properly 
within the state’s police power to regulate and license professions, 
especially when public health concerns are affected.”151 The court held that 
the state’s interest in regulating mental health was compelling and rejected 
the First Amendment challenge.152  
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, the Supreme Court held that the 
state “may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary 
gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to 
prevent.”153 The Ohio Bar Association determined that the attorney violated 
professional ethics and rules of responsibility because he solicited a 
potential client in person and then sued her when she fired him.154 The 
attorney alleged that his in-person solicitation was indistinguishable from 
“truthful, ‘restrained’ advertising concerning ‘the availability and terms of 
routine legal services,’” which the Court already had held that the First 
Amendment protects.155 The Court stated, after surveying several cases, 
“Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to 
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech 
is a component of that activity.”156 The Court acknowledged the marginal 
First Amendment interest at stake, declined to treat this as a commercial 
speech case with intermediate scrutiny, and approached it as a case sui 
generis.157 The “legitimate and important state interest” in protecting 
 
149.  Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978)). 
150.  Id.  
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. at 1054–55.  
153.  436 U.S. 447, 448 (1978).  
154.  Id. at 450–53.  
155.  Id. at 454–55 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Va. Pharmacy 
Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).  
156.  Id. at 456.  
157.  Id. at 459 (“A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only 
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State’s proper sphere of economic 
and professional regulation. While entitled to some constitutional protection, appellant’s conduct is 













consumers and maintaining standards among professionals justified the 
regulation, and the plaintiff even conceded these were “compelling” 
interests when the solicitation involved “fraud, undue influence, 
intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct.’”158 The 
Court held that the prophylactic measure passed constitutional muster and 
the state or bar association need not show injury to the client first before 
taking disciplinary action.159 Ohralik and NAAP illustrate how the Court 
handles cases in which it must consider whether uncovered communications 
previously uncovered by the First Amendment should be brought within the 
ambit of the First Amendment. They are treated as novel situations which 
are ill-suited to rigid categorical rules like the speech-and-action distinction 
and usual standards of scrutiny. Indeed, in Ohralik, the Court did not apply 
a specific standard of scrutiny. Ohralik shows the creative flexibility 
available in unique free speech contexts. 
 
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
 
A few things are clear from the preceding cases. First, the new 
categorical approach of “professional speech” is dead on arrival.160 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent in NIFLA did not 
disagree with the majority’s dismissal of professional speech; the 
concurrence and dissent did not even mention professional speech. This 
direct refusal combined with the Court’s general “reluctan[ce] to mark off 
new categories of speech for diminished constitutional protection” mean 
that the bans on SOCE must stand on distinct legal footing.161 
The Third Circuit could not have been more wrong in King when it 
wrote that, “speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for purposes 
 
158.  Id. at 460.  
159.  Id. at 466–67.  
160.  But see Haupt, supra note 144, at 186 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit mischaracterized 
NIFLA as a professional speech case, that doctrinally there remains a narrow professional speech 
category of lower value protection, and that a narrowly defined professional speech category is proper 
jurisprudence).  
161.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing 
Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.727, 804 (1996) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)); e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (refusing to make violent video games unprotected category of speech); 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (refusing to make depictions of animal cruelty unprotected 
category of speech).  












of the First Amendment.”162 It was correct in King to reject the argument 
that the spoken words became conduct because they were merely the “tool” 
by which the therapy happened, properly relying on Humanitarian Law 
Project.163 However, speech itself is no talisman which grants First 
Amendment protection. Merely because the therapy is conducted using 
speech does not make it protected speech.164 The Court in Ohralik properly 
considered the lawyer’s in-person solicitation of clients as outside the scope 
of free speech protection, even though that solicitation was undertaken 
through speech.165 Additionally, some conduct gets First Amendment 
protection when it is “expressive conduct”—those actions that the speaker 
intends to have an expressive meaning and would be understood as such by 
the audience.166 Clearly, a searching inquiry into the nature and context of 
the actions and words is necessary to determine whether the 
communications fall within the coverage of the First Amendment, much less 
receive First Amendment protection. Additionally, the words exchanged 
during conversion therapy for minors meet none of the purposes behind 
First Amendment protection: seeking truth, promoting self-government, and 
individual autonomy.167 
Bans on SOCE directed at minors should survive free speech 
challenges. Aversion therapy is conduct, a particularly horrific form of 
torture.168 Regulation of conduct need only survive a rational basis 
review.169 The difficulty lies in addressing what to do with talk therapy, 
which has been considered First Amendment protected speech, unprotected 
 
162.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2014). 
163.  Id. at 228 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)). 
164.  See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never been 
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because 
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, 
or printed.”). 
165.  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
166.  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (“An intent to convey a particularized 
message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”); see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate conviction because state law flag-burning prohibition was content-
based regulation of speech); United States v. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny to 
invalidate conviction because federal flag-burning prohibition was content-based regulation of speech). 
167.  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 55, at 5-10. 
168.  WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCH. L., supra note 1; Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“Even more drastic methods, such as castration, have been used.”). 













professional speech, and unprotected conduct. The fundamental failure of 
the Third and Ninth Circuits was to fall into the trap of the speech-and-
action distinction, which has been called “unprincipled and subject to 
manipulation.”170 This venture has been an abject failure, seen in the 
inconsistency of the opinions on the topic. One recent case to address the 
topic granted a preliminary injunction against Tampa, Florida’s ban on 
SOCE, ruling it a content-based regulation of speech.171 In NIFLA, the 
Supreme Court essentially signaled that courts should not apply lower value 
protection to “professional speech.”172 It is necessary to shift the paradigm 
of the whole inquiry and address a fundamental, threshold question about 
First Amendment protection and coverage to finally provide an answer 
about where SOCE stands.173  
SOCE should be outside the scope of First Amendment coverage for 
several reasons. Fraudulent practices are outside the First Amendment’s 
coverage, and SOCE should also be as it is a demonstrably harmful and 
failed practice.174 In Ferguson v. JONAH, a jury found SOCE practitioners 
liable to their former clients for damages because of the expense they paid 
and trauma they incurred in violation of New Jersey consumer protection 
law.175 Benjy Unger, a nineteen year-old deeply devout Orthodox Jew, 
sought out conversion therapy at the advice of his parents.176 He reached 
“Rabbi Arthur Goldberg” (who was in fact not a rabbi but a disbarred 
attorney convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States) who ran Jews 
Offering New Alternatives for Healing (“JONAH”). “Rabbi Goldberg” 
promised Benjy he could help; he had assisted hundreds of young men deal 
with “unwanted same-sex attraction” through “his proven, scientific 
 
170.  Volokh, supra note 29.  
171.  Vazzo v. City of Tampa, No. 8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, slip op. at 2, 26 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 
2019), https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Tampa-conversion-therapy-opinion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4Y6J-D7RT]. However, in a later ruling on the case, the court abandoned its First 
Amendment ruling, deciding the case only on the grounds that Florida state law impliedly preempted 
municipalities from regulating mental health professionals. Vazzo v. City of Tampa, No. 8:17-cv-2896-
T-02AAS, 2019 WL 4919302, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2019).  
172.  See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  
173.  Schauer, supra note 27, at 1765. 
174.  See Victor, supra note 38; Satira, supra note 40.  
175.  See Olga Khazan, The End of Gay Conversion Therapy, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/ 2015/06/the-end-of-gay-conversion-therapy/396953/ 
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176.  Dubrowski, supra note 39, at 77 (quoting and summarizing the Transcript of Trial, Ferguson 
v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 3-4, 2015)).  












program” which could turn Benjy straight in two to four years.177 After 
Benjy wrote a check, he sent him to Alan Downing, a so-called “ex-gay 
counselor” (that is, a conversion therapy “success story”) who possessed no 
academic qualifications other than an undergraduate degree in music and 
theater. Peter Dubrowski described Benjy’s “treatment” based on the trial 
transcript as such:  
Benjy was indeed harmed. Under the guise of treatment, 
Benjy’s “therapist” Alan Downing—himself “ex-gay”—
convinced the young man to undress in one-on-one 
counseling sessions, while Downing stood so close that 
Benjy could feel the older man’s breath on the back of his 
neck. In group sessions with other “journeyers,” the term 
given to other clinic patients, Benjy was instructed to slam 
a tennis racket into a pillow representing his mother until 
his hands bled, while screaming at her for causing him to 
be gay. He received what JONAH called “healthy touch,” 
when he would be cradled by other “ex-gay” men decades 
his senior for up to half an hour at a time. This “treatment” 
cost $100 per one-hour session, with occasional $650 
“weekend retreats.” By the time he left JONAH, Benjy’s 
relationship with his parents was all but destroyed. 
Depression rendered him nonfunctional for months. And 
yes, he was still gay.178 
The jury unanimously found in favor of the plaintiffs.179 Additionally, 
in a landmark pretrial ruling, the “[c]ourt declared—for the first time in 
American history—that homosexuality was not a mental disease, disorder, 
or equivalent thereof as a matter of law.”180 The judge rejected the defense’s 
pretrial argument that the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free 
Exercise clauses entitled them to a dismissal as a matter of law.181 Although 
this was only one trial court decision and verdict, the case represents a 
model for demonstrating the fraudulent nature of conversion therapy in 
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future litigation. The court in Pickup II correctly noted “the well-
documented, prevailing opinion of the medical and psychological 
community” that SOCE is ineffective and harmful.182 The consensus of the 
medical community is evident, as all major American medical organizations 
denounce the practice.183  
SOCE should also be outside the scope of the First Amendment because 
the state has authority to regulate professional and medical malpractice 
through its traditional police power, areas themselves outside the coverage 
of the First Amendment.184 SOCE is analogous to regulations of these kinds 
of communications; if doctors violate their duty of care to provide their 
clients with adequate medical treatment by giving their client bad advice, 
they should not escape liability because their medical treatment took the 
form of the spoken word. Further, the police power allows states to regulate 
to protect their citizens’ health, which is understood to “include [] 
psychological as well as physical well-being.”185 The Ninth Circuit in NAAP 
correctly stated when it upheld California’s licensing scheme for 
psychoanalysts, “[t]hat psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their clients 
does not entitle them, or their profession, to special First Amendment 
protection.”186 As a policy matter, it is sensible to agree with concern of the 
Third Circuit in King that if SOCE is considered speech protected by the 
First Amendment, that argument could extend to place many laws 
regulating doctors and therapists under heightened scrutiny and thus cause 
the unravelling of traditional, reasonable state regulations.187 
It should be uncontroversial to place SOCE outside the coverage of the 
First Amendment as there are numerous categories of unprotected speech 
as well as dozens of kinds of communications that do not even come under 
First Amendment coverage.188 Incitement to imminent lawless action,189 
 
182.  Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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fighting words,190 true threats,191 obscenity,192 defamation,193 and sometimes 
group libel as “hate speech”194 are all categories of speech outside of First 
Amendment protection. Other kinds of communications outside the 
coverage of the First Amendment are deceptive or fraudulent speech,195 the 
law of contracts,196 speech in the context of professional malpractice,197 
speech integral to criminal conduct—like blackmail and planning a 
conspiracy,198 the exchange of information about securities,199 corporate 
proxy statements,200 the exchange of price and production information 
among competitors—violating antitrust laws,201 and employers’ threats of 
retaliation for the labor activities of employees.202 SOCE should join this 
list.  
The narrowness of the SOCE bans supports the argument that 
conversion therapy is outside the scope of the First Amendment. The Court 
wrote in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, “Where the government does not target 
 
190.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words are “those which by 
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192.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (“obscene material is material which 
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v. Smith (The Skokie Case), 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (invalidating ordinances targeted 
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195.  Schauer, supra note 27, at 1768. 
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198.  Volokh, supra note 29, at 989.  
199.  See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969). What is key here is that the Court did not discuss a First Amendment issue at all. That is, neither 
party nor the Court thought it merited any discussion.  
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conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from 
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or 
philosophy.”203 There are many kinds of expression and action still allowed 
under bans on SOCE.204 They do not prohibit someone advocating the 
efficacy of conversion therapy. They do not mandate the contours of public 
debate. They do not require people to publicly profess their faith in the 
wisdom of the states’ decisions, nor do they require doctors to publicly 
reject SOCE. The laws do not even prevent practitioners from discussing 
conversion therapy with their patients, recommending SOCE, or referring 
them to unlicensed practitioners, organizations, or religious leaders. The 
laws do not even prevent unlicensed practitioners from practicing or 
advocating SOCE. The laws do not tell ministers what they can preach from 
the pulpit about the moral implications of homosexuality, ban rabbis from 
ruminating about gender fluidity, or mandate imams inculcate their faithful 
with a socially progressive agenda. 
Rather, the laws are quite narrow. They prevent licensed medical 
professionals from exacting extraordinary harm on minors by conducting 
demonstrably harmful therapy.205 Doctors should not be able to use their 
licenses to masquerade quackery as competence. These laws are necessary 
to protect minors.  
It is worth explaining why it would be doctrinally incorrect to uphold 
bans on conversion therapy based on O’Brien scrutiny. The argument would 
go that because the Third and Ninth Circuits analyzed conversion therapy 
along the speech-and-action distinction, and NIFLA rejected the 
“professional speech” category, that O’Brien scrutiny remains the only 
route to uphold bans on SOCE. This proponent would argue that regulations 
of “talk therapy” are at most regulations of conduct with an incidental effect 
on speech. This analysis would lean heavily on arguing that the speech is 
just the “tool” used to undertake the conduct of therapy, similar to the 
district court’s argument in King v. Christie.206 “[T]he incidental restriction 
on alleged First Amendment freedoms” by a ban on SOCE would be “no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of” the government interest.207 
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The bans affect only a limited range of conduct between the practitioner and 
the patient while allowing the practitioner to still recommend it to patients, 
refer them to other resources, and advocate it as good policy.208  
However, this approach fails the threshold requirement of O’Brien: that 
“the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech.”209 When 
SOCE is conceptualized as speech, banning it becomes an impermissible 
content-based regulation of speech.210  This is because the government bans 
a particular form of therapy because it disagrees with its content—i.e., that 
gay people can and should be made straight. It would also be viewpoint-
based discrimination;211 the ban would still allow doctors to practice gender-
transition and gender-affirming therapies. Still, as this note has extensively 
demonstrated, obsession with levels of scrutiny and the speech versus action 
distinction fail to address the fundamental, threshold question: What kinds 
of communications should be covered under the First Amendment? The 
court in Ferguson v. JONAH was correct to hold SOCE fraud and outside 
the scope of the First Amendment.212  
First Amendment values are essential to any thorough discussion of free 
speech. Bans on conversion therapy and other sexual orientation change 
efforts are consistent with the underlying values and principles of the First 
Amendment. First, bans on SOCE are consistent with First Amendment 
values because the bans are narrow.  A principal purpose the First 
Amendment is to support self-government.213 Nothing in the bans prevents 
SOCE advocates from going to their state legislatures and arguing that the 
bans should be repealed as bad policy—and nothing should stop this kind 
of political advocacy.214 Such a ban could still be overturned by a 
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democratic majority. This is analogous to the Ninth Circuit holding in 
Conant v. Walters that the government may prohibit doctors from writing 
prescriptions for marijuana, but that the Free Speech clause prevents the 
state from prohibiting doctors from recommending or discussing medical 
marijuana with their patients.215 The doctors remain free to advocate 
medical marijuana as good public policy just as SOCE bans allow the 
practitioners to lobby their representatives for a change in the law.  
Additionally, the bans do not interfere with the “marketplace of 
ideas.”216 SOCE practitioners remain free to advocate the efficacy of the 
practice and moral fortitude of their cisgender, heteronormative mold from 
any place they like: the pulpit, the opinion column, leaflets, the town square, 
and any place else.217 The truth of conversion therapy’s depravity can win 
out without suppression of its advocacy.218 People will still have the 
opportunity to see the collision of truth, falsity, and partial truth which leads 
society to a fuller understanding of the Truth.219  
Finally, the ban on SOCE for minors is also consistent with the principle 
that the First Amendment protects individual autonomy.220 If adults, in their 
process of self-determination, decide that they want to undergo conversion 
therapy, they should be free to do so.221 It is consistent with a negative 
theory of the state that government not interfere when a consenting adult 
wants to pursue their self-determination, as long as those actions do not 
harm others. There are queer, religious people who want to live consistent 
with their faith, and even though most LGBTQ individuals would never 
voluntarily undergo conversion therapy, each individual in this country 
should remain free to choose their own path.222  
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Under this analysis, the bans on conversion therapy are outside the 
coverage of the First Amendment. The ruling in NIFLA that “professional 
speech” has no place in First Amendment jurisprudence is no obstacle to 
this approach. Courts and commentators are wrong to cite NIFLA as 
evidence that the Supreme Court opposes bans on SOCE. The Court already 
denied the opportunity to directly overturn California’s and New Jersey’s 
bans on SOCE. Bans on SOCE are consistent with First Amendment values: 
seeking truth, promoting self-government, and individual autonomy. 
It is time for Congress to pass the proposed national ban on “provid[ing] 
conversion therapy to any individual if such person receives compensation 
in exchange for such services.”223 This exceedingly harmful therapy has 
already wrought its suffering on hundreds of thousands of Americans. 
Outlawing conversion therapy by licensed medical professionals is not only 
proper under the First Amendment, but also the right thing to do. We in the 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer community should no longer 
suffer under quackery masquerading as competence. Diversity strengthens 
America. This country is at its best when it lives up to its aspirational 
founding as the home of freedom and equality. Taking steps to end these 
horrible practices will affirm the nation’s commitment to provide a 
foundation for a pluralistic society where people are free to live joyfully as 
they are.  
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